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594 TAYLOR V. OAKLAND SCAVENGER CO. [17 C. (2d) 
[So F. No. 16470. In Bank.-March 11, 1941.J 
ELEANOR TAYLOR, a Minor, etc., Respondent, V. OAK· 
LAND SCAVENGER COMP ANY (a Corporation) 
et al., Appellants. 
[1] Automobiles - Operation - Conduct of Operator-Injuries Off 
Highway-School Grounds.-A truck driver has a clear duty 
of care towards pedestrians, and is required to exercise greater 
caution in a school yard than in ordinary circumstances. 
[2] Id.-Operation-Actions~Sufficiency of Evidence-Injuries 
to Persons on Foot-School Grounds.-There was substantial 
evidence to support the finding that the driver of the truck 
into which the high school pupil ran as it was driven around a 
blind corner of the gymnasium building was negligent where 
he was familiar with the school grounds, and knew that chil-
dren frequently ran across the area but, without sounding his 
horn or giving other warning, drove around the corner 1lt a 
rate of speed five miles in excess of the prima facie r;;peed 
limit of the Vehicle Code. 
[3] Schools - Actions, etc.-Liability - Injuries to Pupils.-It is 
the duty of school authorities to supervise the conduct of chil-
dren on the school grounds and to enforce rules and regula-
tions necessary to their protection. A school district is liable 
for injuries which result from the failure of its officers and 
employees to use ordinary care in such respect. 
[4] Id.-Actions, etc.-Actions-Evidence.-In an action for per-
sonal injuries sustained by a high school pupil who ran into a 
garbage truck at a blind corner upon the school grounds, the 
evidence justified a finding of negligence of the school district 
where it established that the principal of the high school knew 
for seven years of the practice of students to surge out of the 
gymnasium and run to the playground, that school authorities 
took no precautions to minimize the danger of· injury to 
students after motor trucks had entered the grounds other 
4. See 23 Cal. Jur. 110. 
McK. Dig. References: 1. Automobiles, § 111; 2. Automobiles, 
§ 231; 3,5. Schools, § 68; 4. Schools, § 74; 6,8,10. Schools, § 75; 
7. Automobiles, § 335; 9. Trial, § 141; 11. Negligence, § 19; 12. 
Negligence, § 238; 13. Negligence, § 52 (1); 14. Schools, § 76; 15. 
Master and Servant, § 206; 16. Independent Contractors, § 22; 
17. Automobiles, § 174; 18. Evidence, § 102; 19. Appeal, § 1536-2; 
20. Damages, § 102. 
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than to issue an instruction to caution people to drive care-
fully, did not post a danger sign or warning to students against 
running about the courtyard and permitted trucks to drive on 
the schools grounds at all times subject only to safety pro-
visions of the Vehicle Code. 
[5] Id.-Actions, etc.-Liability-Injuries to Pupils-Foreseeable-
ness of InjurY.-As respects injuries to a high school pupil 
who ran into a garbage truck at a blind corner of the school 
grounds, it was not necessary to prove that the very injury 
which occurred must have been foreseeable by school authori-
ties, in order to establish that their failure to provide safe-
guards constituted negligence, since their negligence is estab-
lished if a reasonably prudent person would foresee that 
injuries of the same general type would be likely to happen in 
absence of such safeguards. 
[6] Id.-Actions, etc.-Actions-Trial-Instructions.-In an ac-
tion for personal injuries sustained by a high school pupil who 
ran into a garbage truck at a blind corner upon the school 
grounds, the assertion that the trial court erroneously failed 
to instruct on the right of the school authorities to rely on 
the provisions of the Vehicle Code was untenable where such 
matter was covered by an instruction that the provisions of the 
Vehicle Code are applicable to vehicles on school grounds in 
the absence of special regulations, and that the question as to 
whether school authorities should have imposed special regu-
lations and conditions governing traffic on the grounds was 
one of fact to be determined in light of the conditions exist-
ing at the time of the accident. 
[7] Automobiles - Operation - Actions_Instructions-Care and 
Conduct of Operators-Care Toward Persons on Foot-School 
Grounds.-In an action for personal injuries sustained by a 
high school pupil who ran into a garbage truck at a blind 
corner upon the school grounds, the court did not erroneously 
instruct the jury that the driver of the truck was not ob-
ligated to follow the provisions of the Vehicle Code applicable 
to the circumstances, where it quoted relevant sections of the 
Vehicle Code, told the jury that such provisions were appli-
cable to traffic on school grounds in absence of special regula-
tions, and further instructed that the driver had a clear duty 
to drive his truck on school grounds at a reasonable and proper 
speed in the circumstances, with special regard to the prob-
ability of encountering school children. 
[8] Schools-Actions, etc.-Actions-Trial-Instructions.-In an 
action for personal injuries sustained by a high school pupil 
when she ran into a garbage truck at a blind corner upon the 
school grounds, instructions that the general provisions of the 
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Vehicle Code may be inadequate for situations arising on 
school grounds were not error. 
[9] Trial- Instructions - Manner of Giving - Substitution of 
Proper Instruction.-The withdrawing of an instruction which 
omitted an essential element, te~reading it to the jury, and 
instructing them to disregard it, and then reading a proper 
instruction in its place was not improper or reversible error. 
[10] Schools - Actions, etc.~Actions - Trial-Instructions.~An 
instruction in the language of School Code, section 2.801, re-
specting liability of a school district for negligence of its 
officers and employees did not impose a greater burden on the 
district than that enjoined by law, nor did it make the district 
an insurer of the safety of its pupils, where it expressly 
stated that the district was not an insurer and that the school 
authorities were required to exercise ordinary care only. 
[11] Negligence - Proximate Oause ~ Concurrent Oause.-If an 
injury is produced by the concurrent effect of two separate 
wrongful acts, each is a proximate cause of the injury, and 
neither can operate as an efficient intervening cause with re-
gard to the other. The fact that neither party could reason-
ably anticipate the occurrence of the other concurrent cause 
will not shield him from liability so long as his own negligence 
was one of the causes of the injury. 
[12] Id.-Review-Questions of Law and Fact-Rule Where Evi-
dence is Oonflicting - Ooncurrent Negligence.-Where more 
than one conclusion may reasonably be drawn from the con-
flicting evidence, the determination of the jury that the neg-
ligence of each defendant contributed concurrently to the 
plaintiff's injury cannot be disturbed on appeal. 
[13] ld.-Exercise of Oare by Particular Persons-Infants-De-
grees of Oare Required.-A high school pupil fifteen years of 
age who was injured when she ran into a garbage truck at a 
blind corner upon the school grounds Was bound only to that 
duty of care which a normal child of the same age would be 
expected to exercise in such a situation. 
[14] Schools-Actions, etc.-Actions-Appeal-Questions of Fact. 
Whether a flfteen year old girl in a physical education class 
on grounds of a high school, used mainly for school activities 
and not as a thoroughfare for automobiles, exercised proper 
caution in running across the courtyard toward the athletic 
field without being on the alert for the sudden appearance of a 
9. See 24 Oal. Jur. 867; 14 R. O. L. 812. 
11. See 19 Oal. Jur. 572; 22 R. O. L. 128. 
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garbage truck into which she tan, was a question for the jury 
where the appellate court could not say as a matter of law 
that the jury was unjustified in finding her free from fault. 
[15] Master and Servant-Liability to Third Persons-Relation of 
Parties-Ilmployee or Independent Oontractor.-An employer 
is generally,liable for negligent acts of an employee performed 
within scope of employment, but if an independent contractor 
rather than master and servant relationship exists, the inde-
pendent contractor usually is alone liable for his negligent 
acts. 
[16] Independent Oontractors-Liability of Employer-Exceptions 
to Rule-In General.-If a contractor undertakes to carry on 
an activity involving possible danger to the public under a 
license or franchise granted by public authority, subject to 
obligations or liabilities imposed by the authority, such liabil-
ities may not be evaded by delegating performance to an in-
dependent contractor. In such case the original contractor 
remains subject to liability for harm caused by the negligence 
of the independent contractor employed' to do the work. 
[17] Automobiles - Operation - Persons Liable-Employer-Acts 
of Independent Oontractors.-Where a scavenger company was 
franchised by a city to carryon an activity requiring the 
operation of large motor vehicles upon the public streets which 
involved the risk of danger to the public and the city by ordi-
nance and contract required that the company must assume 
master and servant liability for the acts of its garbage col-
lectors, the ordinance and contract fixed a liability upon the 
company for damages for injuries to the public which it 
could not escape by delegating performance to an independent 
contractor. 
[18] Evidence-Admissibility-Insutance Against Loss-Limita-
tions on Rule.-A contract otherwise admissible in evidence is 
not tendered inadmissible because of an incidental disclosure 
therein that insurance against loss was carried. 
[19] Appeal~Determination-HarIl'1less and Reversible Error-
Argument and Oonduct of Oounsel-Examination of Wit~ 
nesses.-Misconduct of counsel in questioning a witness con-
cerning an attempt to photograph the plaintiff without her 
knowledge was not sufficiently prejudicial to justify a rever-
sal, especially since the trial court refused to grant a new 
trial on such ground. 
[20] Damages-Inadequate and Excessive Damages-Damages not 
Excessive - Injur.y to Leg or Knee - Foot.-An award of 
$25,000, reduced by the trial court to $20,000, was not excessive 
where the plaintiff, a girl fifteen years of age, sustained an 
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injury which tore the sale lose from her foot in such manner 
as to render' the foot permanently defE!ctive with a possibility 
of ultimate loss. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Ala-
meda County: Leon E. Gray, Judge. Affirmed. 
Ralph E. Hoyt, District Attorney, Charles V. Barfield and 
Appelbaum & Mitchell for Appellant Oakland High School 
District. 
Weinmann, Quayle & Berry for Appellant Oakland Sca'Veh-
ger Company et a1. 
Elliott Johnson and Crozier C. Culp for Respo~dent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff, a fifteen year old girl was en-
rolled in the Castlemont High School in Oakland ~here she 
took the required course in physical education. On Sep-
tember29, 1936, she and other members of the class as-
sembled in the gymnasium, changed from street to gymna-
sium clothes,and received instructions from the teacher to 
go outdoors into the athletic neld to play volley ball. As was 
. their custom, most of the members of the class surged out 
of the gymnasium and commenced rUnning to the field. 
Plaintiff took the lead, followed closely by a classmate, and 
ran nortl1- in a passageway between the main high school 
building and the gymnasium. .As she approached the north-
east corner of the gymnasium, a blind corner, a garbage truck 
came around the corner without warning and turned toward 
her at a rate of about twenty-five miles per hour. Plaintiff, 
unable to stop herself, struck the truck at the cab door and 
was k;nocked to the pavement. While in that position the 
. right rear wheel of the truck ran over .her left foot and tore 
the sole loose from the foot in such a manner as to render 
her foot permanently defective with a possibility of ultimate 
loss. 
Plaintiff brought suit against Albert Santucci, the drivel' 
of the truck j Oresti Santucci, the oWner of the truck j the 
Oakland Scavenger Company, under contract with the city 
to collect and dispose of garbage j and the Oakland High 
School District. She claimed that the truck was driven in 
a negligent manner, that the owner of'the truck was an em-
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ployee of the Oakland Scavenger Company, and that the 
school district was negligent in failing to take adequate pre-
cautionary measures to prevent such accidents. 
The judgment of the trial court which sustained without 
leave to amend a demurrer of the defendant Oakland High 
School District was reversed by this court on appeal. (12 
Cal. (2d) 310 [83 Pac. (2d) 849].) Upon a trial of the case 
the jury awarded plaintiff damages in the amount of $25,000 
against all of the· defendants. The trial court denied a mo-
tion for a neW trial on the condition. that plaintiff accept a 
reduction of the amount to $20,000, and judgment was en-
tered accordingly. All defendants have appealed. 
'l.'he school district claims that there is no evidence estab-
lishing negligence on its part and' that the negligence of the 
truck driver was an efficient intervening cause insulating 
it from liability. The Santuccis and the Oakland Scavenger 
Company claim that there is no evidence establishing the 
negligence of the dri'Ver of the truck, that the negligence of 
the scho()l district is an efficient intervening cause insulating 
them from liability, that the trial court committed preju-
dicial error in admitting certain evidence, and that plain-
tiff's counsel was guilty of prejudicial misconduc( The Oak-
land Scavenger Company further denies liability on the 
grOUnd that the owner of the truck was an independent con-
tractor and n()t an employee. In addition,. all of the defend-
ants assert that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negli-
gence as a matter of law, that the trial court erred in giving 
certain instructions and withholding others, and that the 
damage award is excessive as a matter of law. 
[1, 2] There is substantial evidence to support the find-
ing by the jury that the driver of the truck was negligent; 
A driver has a clear duty of care toward pedestrians, and 
he is required to exercise greater caution in a school yard 
than under ordinary circumstances. (Lampton v. Davis S. 
Bread 00., 48 CaL App. 116 [191 Pac. 710].) He was 
,familiar with the courtyard where the accident occurred, and 
,knew that children frequently ran across the area. He 
nevertheless drove around the blind corner without sounding· 
his horn or giving other warning at a rate of about twenty-
five miles per hour, five miles in excess of the prima facie 
. speed limit set by the Vehicle Code, thereby causing' injury to 
, the plaintiff. 
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[3, 4] There is likewise sufficient evidence to' justify the 
finding Df negligence Dn the part Df defendant SChDDl dis-
trict. It is the dutYDf the' SChDDl authDrities to' supervise 
at all times the conduct Df the children Dn the SChDDl grDunds 
and to' enforce thDse rules and regulatiDns necessary to their 
prDtection. (Bellman v. San Francisco High School Dist., 
11 Cal. (2d) 576 [81 Pac. (2d) 894] ; Ogando v. Carquinez G. 
School Dist., 24 Cal. App. (2d) 567 [75 Pac. (2d) 641].) 
The SChDDl district is liable for injuries which result from 
a failure of its officers and emplDyees to use ordinary care 
in this respect. (Ibid.) The e'\Tidence in this case estab-
lishes that the principal Df the CastlemDnt High School knew 
for seven years of the practice of students in physical educa-
tiDn classes to surge Dut of the gymnasium and run alDng 
the cDurtyard to' the playgrDund. The school authDrities 
likewise knew that at least six delivery trucks came into the 
. grounds every mDrning, seven other trucks once a week, and 
five more trucks every week or twO'. They nevertheless took 
no precautions to' minimize the danger of injury to the 
students after the trucks had entered the grounds other 
than to issue an instructiDn to the custDdian of the grounds 
to' supervise the traffic that came Dn the grounds and to' 
caution people to drive carefully. They failed to PDst a 
danger sign or to' warn the students against running across 
the eourtyard. The eighteen trucks were permitted to drive 
Dn the SChODl grDunds at all times subject to nO' safety regula-
tions other than the general prDvisions Df the Vehicle Code. 
I I The question whether there has been neglig{lnce in per-
mitting vehicles Dn SChDDl premises subject only to the prDvi-
sions of the Vehicle CDde relating to' traffic on the highways 
is to be determined on the facts of each case." (Taylor v. 
Oakland Scavenger Co., 12 Cal. (2d) 310 [83 Pac. (2d) 
948].) [5] It is not necessary to prove that the very in-
jury which occurred must have been foreseeable by the school 
authorities in order to establish that their failure to' provide 
additional safeguards constituted negligence; Theil' negli-
gence is established if a reasonably prudent, persO'n would 
foresee that injuries of the same general type would be likely 
to' happen in the absence of such safeguards. 
[6] The school district contends that the trial court 
failed to instruct the jury that if the school authorities were 
justified in relying upon the provisions of the Vehicle Code 
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as adequate for the protection of the children on the grounds 
and were nDt guilty Df any negligence, the SChDDl district 
wDuld not be liable. The trial cDurt, hDwever, cDvered this 
matter when it instructed the jury that the only basis fDr 
impDsing liability Dn the SChDDl district is the negligence of its 
Dfficers Dr emplDyers,that the prDvisiDns of the Vehicle CDde 
are applicable to' vehicles Dn the SChDDl grDunds in the ab-
sence Df special regulatiDns, and that the question whether 
the SChDDl authorities shDuld have impDsed special regulations 
and cDnditions governing traffic on the grounds is Dne Df fact 
to be determined in light Df the conditiDns existing at the 
time Df the accident. [7] NDr is there merit in the argument 
Of the SChDDl district that the trial CDurt errDneDusly instructed 
the jury that the driver Df the truck was nDt Dbligated to' 
fDllDW the provisions of the Vehicle Code applicable to the 
circumstances. The court quoted the relevant sections Df the 
Vehicle Code to the jury, told them that such provisions were 
applicable to traffic Dn the school grounds in the absence of 
special regulations, and further instructed them that the 
driver of the truck had a clear duty to drive his truck on the 
school grDunds "at a careful and prudent speed, not greater 
than was reasonable and proper, under all the circumstances 
then and there eXisting, with special regard to the probability 
of encountering schoDI children, moving, proceeding, walking 
or running upon said grounds and premises." 
[8] The trial court's use of language from the opinion of 
this court when this case was before it on demurrer (Taylor v. 
Oakland Scavenger Co., supra) in its instructiDns to the jury 
that the general provisions of the Vehicle Code may be inade- . 
quate for situations arising on school grounds likewise does 
not constitute error. The instruction was sound as a :inatter 
of law,and left to the jury the determination of the facts. 
[9] One of the instructions to the jury as first given 
omitted the element Df proximate cause. The trial court sub-
sequently withdrew the erroneous instruction, re~read it to' 
the members of the jury, told them to' disregard it, and issued 
a proper Dne in its place. This methDd of substitutiDn of 
instructions, the only prR0tical one available to the court, 
does not constitute prejudicial error. (See 24 Cal. JUl'. 867.) 
[10J In i:nstructing the jury that the school district was 
liable for the negligence of its officers and employees, the 
trial court used the language' employed in section 2.801 of 
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the School Code and therefore did not impose a greater bur· 
den on the school district than that enjoined by law. Neither 
did it make the school district an insurer of the safety of its 
pupils, for it expressly instru<lted the jury that the district 
was not an insurer of the pupils and that the school authori-
ties were required to exercise only ordinary care. Taken as 
a whole the instructions to the jury present the proper legal 
principles and contain no prejudicial error. 
The school district maintains, however, that any breach 
of duty on the part of its employees was not a proximate cause 
of the injury to plaintiff because the negligence of the truck 
driver was an efficient intervening cause. Conversely, the 
Santuccis and the Scavenger Company contend that any 
breach of duty on the part of the truck driver was not a 
proximate cause of the injury because the negligence of the 
school authorities was an efficient intervening cause. [11] 
If an injury is produced by the concurrent effect of two sep-
arate wrongful acts, each is a proximate cause of the injury, 
and neither can operate as an efficient intervening cause with 
regard to the other. (Rest., Torts, sees. 432 (2),439; .Lacy v. 
Pacific Gas &; Electric 00., 220 Cal. 97 [29 Pac. (2d) 781]; 
Smith v. Schwartz, 14 Cal. App. (2d) 160 (57 Pac. (2d) 
1386].) The fact that neither party could reasonably an-
ticipate the occurrence of the other concurrent cause will not 
shield him from liability so long as his own negligence was 
one of the causes of the injury. (H erro1t v. Smith Bros., Inc., 
116 Cal. App. 518 (2 Pac. (2d) 1012] ; Sawdey v. Producers' 
Milk 00. et al., 107 Cal. App. 467 [290 Pac. 684].) [12] 
The arguments of defendants themselves make clear that 
more than one conclusion may reasonably be drawn from the 
conflicting evidence of this case, and the determination of 
the jury that the negligence of each defendant contributed 
concurrently to the plaintiff's injury cannot therefore be dis-
turbed on appeal. (Lacy v. Pacific Gas &; Electric 00., 
supra; Smith v. Schwartz, StLpra.) 
[13, 14] The defendants are united, however, in the con-
tention that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence 
as a matter of law. The jury found plaintiff not guilty of 
contributory negligence. " Contributory negligence is a ques-
tion of law only when the court is impelled to say that from 
the facts reasonable men can draw but one inference, and 
that an inference pointing unerringly to the negligence of 
---~------
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the plaintiff contributing to his injury." (Smellie v. So. 
'i Pac. 00., 212 CaL 540 at 562 [299 Pac. 529J ; Flores v. Fitz-
gerald, 204 Cal. 374 [268 Pac. 369].) Plaintiff is bound 
only to that duty of. care which a normal child of the same 
age would be expected to exercise in such a situation. (An-
derson v. Walters, 135 Cal. App. 380 [27 Pac. (2d) 100]; 
19 Cal. JUl'. 605.) The question is not whether plain-
tiff must be viewed as an adult or as a child but simply 
whether the plaintiff as a fifteen year old girl in a physical 
education class on the grounds. of a high school, used mainly 
for school activities and not as a thoroughfare for automo-
biles, exercised propel' caution in running across the court-
yard toward the athletic field without being on the alert for 
the sudden appearance of a motor vehicle. The answer is 
not so obvious that this court can say as a matter of law that 
the jury was unjustified in finding plaintiff free from fault 
(Shannon v. Central-Gaither U. School Dist., 133 Cal. App. 
124 [23 Pac. (2d) 769]), particularly when the record shows 
that plaintiff had never seen automobiles or trucks pass the 
gymnasium while children were on the school grounds. There 
is evidence indicating that it was customary for most of the 
children in the physical education classes to run across the 
courtyard to the athletic field. To hold that the plaintiff was 
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law is to 
hold that a majority of average children in a like situation 
have been acting in a negligent manner, a result which con-
tradicts the very standard utilized in determining the exist" 
ence of negligence. 
[15--17] The Oakland Scavenger Company contends that 
under its contract with Oresti Santucci the latter was an inde-
pendent contractor and that it therefore is not liable for any 
negligence of the truck driver. It points out that the truck 
Was not owned by it but by Santucci and that it exercised little 
supervision or control over the collection and disposal of the 
garbage by Santucci. Plaintiff introduced in evidence not 
only the garbage ordinance of the City of Oakland (852 
N. S.), which makes it unlawful for any per!\on other than a 
contractor with the city or a person in the employ of such 
contractor to collect garbage within the city, but the con-
trMt between the City of Oakland and the Oakland Scavenger 
Company in which it was agreed that any person collecting 
garbage for the Scavenger Company was to be considered an 
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employee of such company. Plaintiff introduced also the 
contract between the Oakland Scavenger Company and Oresti 
Santucci which is expressly made subject to all regulations 
and ordinances of the City of Oakland, as well as to the re-
quirements of other contracting parties with the Scavenger 
Company. It requires Oresti Santucci to keep his trucks in-
sured against damage to persons and property in order to 
protect the Scavenger Company from any claim that might 
arise against it because of his accidental or wilful misconduct, 
to keep his truck numbered and painted in a uniform color 
to be determined by the Scavenger Company, and to supply 
his collectors with a special badge bearing a serial number 
determined by the Scavenger Company. 
An employer is generally liable for negligent acts of an 
employee performed within the scope of employment, but 
if an independent contractor rather than master and ser-
vant relationship exists, the independent contractor usually 
is alone liable for his negligent acts. If, however, an indi-
vidual or corporation undertakes to carryon an activity 
involving possible danger to the public under a license or fran-
chise granted by public authority subject to certain obliga-
tions or liabilities imposed by the public authority, these 
liabilities may not be evaded by delegating performance to 
. an independent contractor. The original contractor remains 
subject to liability for harm caused by the negligence of the 
independent contractor employed to do the work. (Rest., 
Torts., secs. 417, 428; Snow v. Marian Realty Co., 212 Cal. 
622 [299 Pac. 720] ; Luce v. Holloway, 156 Cal. 162 [103 Pac. 
866]; Oolgrove v. Smith, 102 Cal. 220 [36 Pac. 411, 27 
L. R. A. 590] ; Spe'IWe v. Schultz, 103 Cal. 208 [37 Pac. 220] ; 
Ohicago Economic Fuel Gas Co. v. Myers, 168 Ill. 139 [48 
N. E. 66]; Ootton v. Ship-By Truck 00., 337 Mo. 270 [85 
S. W. (2d) 80,81] ; West v. St. Louis et al., 63 Ill. 545; Mur-
ray v. Lehigh Valley R. 00., 66 Conn. 512 [34 Atl. 506, 32 
L. R. A. 539] ; 39 C. J. 1338.) The Oakland Scavenger Com-
pany was franchised by the city to carryon an activity re-
quiring@le operation of large motor vehicles upon the publi~ 
streets which clearly involved the risk of danger to the publi<J 
The city, by ordinance and by contract with the Scavenger 
Company, enunciated a rule of policy to the effect that as a 
condition of exercising the franchise the Scavenger Company 
must assume master and servant liability for the acts of per-
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sons engaged by it to collect garbage. Both the ordinance 
and the contract are admissible to establish this rule of policy. 
While they do not establish that Sl\ntucci was an employee 
of the Scavenger Company rather than an independent con-
tractor, they fix a liability upon the Scavenger Company 
which it cannot escape by delegating performance to an in-
dependent contractor. 
[18] Plaintiff introduced the contract between the Scav-
enger Company and Oresti Santucci for the purpose of show-
ing that these parties themselves contemplated an employer-
employee relationship. The Scavenger Company remains 
liable whether or not this contract actually established such a 
relationship, but plaintiff could properly introduce the con-
tract in evidence in an attempt to establish the existence of 
a master and servant relationship as one basis of liability. 
The incidental disclosure by the contract that Santucci was 
insured does not render it inadmissible since proper grounds 
exist for its admission. (Schellenberg v. Southern Cal. Music 
Co., 139 Cal. App. 777 [35 Pac. (2d) 156]; Perry v. A. Pala-
dini, Inc., 89 Cal. App. 275 [264 Pac. 580].) 
[19] Any misconduct which may have existed on the part 
of plaintiff's attorney in questioning one of defendants' wit-
nesses concerning an attempt to photograph the plaintiff 
without her knowledge is not sufficiently prejudicial to jus-
tify reversal, especially since the trial court refused to grant 
a new trial on this ground. (See Imlay v. California Cab 
Co., 124 Cal. App. 68 [11 Pac. (2d) 1116J; Alberts v. Lytle, 
1 Cal. App. (2d) 682 [37 Pac. (2d) 705].) 
[20] In view of the serious injury to plaintiff's foot 
with the accompanying pain, worry, embarrassment and re-
striction of activity, as well as the possibility of eventual loss 
of the foot, the damages as finally assessed by the trial court 
are not excessive as a matter of law. 
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 
Edmonds, J., Curtis, J., Carter, J., and Gibson, C. J., con. 
curred. 
